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A model is proposed to characterize the type of knowledge acquired in artificial grammar learning 
(AGL). In particular, Shannon entropy is employed to compute the complexity of different test 
items in an AGL task, relative to the training items. According to this model, the more predictable 
a test item is from the training items, the more likely it is that this item should be selected as 
compatible with the training items. The predictions of the entropy model are explored in relation 
to the results from several previous AGL datasets and compared to other AGL measures. This 
particular approach in AGL resonates well with similar models in categorization and reasoning 
which also postulate that cognitive processing is geared towards the reduction of entropy.
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At a broad level, the present model of AGL is based on what we 
can call the Information Premise: In processing new information, the 
cognitive system prefers choices that allow for the greatest reduction 
in entropy (note that entropy means uncertainty in this context 
and the two terms will be used interchangeably throughout the 
paper). In other words, we suggest that the objective of the cognitive 
system is to represent the world with information that is as certain 
as possible (cf. Anderson, 1991). The meaning of “preference” is 
restricted to choices relevant to the task at hand, for example, in 
terms of establishing some type of conclusion on the basis of given 
premises. Work in reasoning by Oaksford and Chater (1994) and 
categorization by Pothos and Chater (2002) can both be interpreted 
as applications of the Information Premise (further discussion of 
this work is reserved until later).
The way the Information Premise is applied to AGL is as fol-
lows. Suppose that test items are encoded without any regard of 
the information collected during training, as novel instances. 
In such a case, in perceiving a test stimulus there is no informa-
tion about its structure, in the sense that all possible arrange-
ments of symbols are equally likely. This option involves a lot of 
uncertainty. Conversely, suppose we parse test stimuli by taking 
into account structural constraints which have been identified 
in training. In this case, some symbol arrangements would be 
recognized as more likely than others, and so processing differ-
ent test stimuli would involve less uncertainty. The Information 
Premise suggests that the cognitive system will consider a test 
item as more compatible with the training ones, if it can be 
specified with less uncertainty on the basis of information from 
training. In other words, it is suggested that AGL performance 
can be accurately described by considering the extent to which 
new instances can be encoded, or parsed, on the basis of old ones 
(cf. Pothos and Wolff, 2006).
The structure of the paper is as follows. I will first consider the 
AGL learning experimental task in a little more detail and the pro-
posals which have been put forward to explain human behavior in 
the task. I will then formally apply the Information Premise in AGL 
to develop an entropy model for AGL and will discuss its relation 
to other theoretical proposals. Finally, a range of analyses will be 
employed to illustrate the model’s properties.
IntroductIon
Shannon entropy is one of the most standard ways of quantifying 
uncertainty in making a selection. For example, imagine you have 
a bag of blue and red marble balls and you are trying to predict 
whether the next ball you will pick is red or blue. If there are nine 
red balls and only one blue ball in the bag, you are likely to be fairly 
certain that the one you select will be red. If, on the other hand, there 
are five reds and five blues, you would have no idea whether to expect 
a red or a blue one in a selection. In this second situation there is 
more uncertainty than in the first one; that is, the outcome of the 
selection process is less predictable. Shannon entropy is  quantified 
using the equation Entropy=−
=∑ p pii
N
ilog21 , where the index i 
labels the different possibilities in a situation (in the above example, 
selecting either a red or a blue ball), and p
i
 refers to the probability 
of occurrence of each of these possibilities. On the whole, entropy 
is higher when there are many, equiprobable, possibilities.
Entropy is routinely employed in thermodynamics in physics, as 
a way of quantifying how “disorderly” a system is and, also, it is one 
of the key constructs in information theory, as it provides a measure 
of regularity in information. Why should psychologists care about 
entropy? A short answer is because psychologists are interested in 
probability and entropy is a way of quantifying uncertainty in prob-
ability (a longer answer will be provided in the final section, once some 
promising results have been shown). This work explores a model for 
artificial grammar learning (AGL) based on entropy. AGL is a widely 
employed paradigm for the study of learning processes. It involves 
asking participants to (usually passively) observe a set of stimuli in a 
training phase. Subsequently, in a test phase they have to decide which 
new stimuli are compatible with the ones in training; no corrective 
feedback is typically provided. AGL is an important experimental task 
because it has been used to debate just about every theory of learning 
which has been prominent in the last few decades, from associative 
learning (e.g., Perruchet and Pacteau, 1990) to connectionist models 
(e.g., Cleeremans and McClelland, 1991; Dienes, 1992) to exemplar 
similarity (e.g., Vokey and Brooks, 1994) to concrete rules (e.g., Dulany 
et al., 1984) to abstract rules (Reber and Allen, 1978). So, in proposing 
a new theory of (or approach for) learning, doing so in the context of 
AGL, allows a researcher to concretely appreciate the theory’s distinc-
tive features relative to several other theories.
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ArtIfIcIAl grAmmAr leArnIng
An artificial grammar, or a finite state language, is a set of rules to 
distinguish legal, or grammatical (G), arrangements of symbols, 
from illegal, or ungrammatical (NG) ones (for a review see Pothos, 
2007). The rules used to construct the G items for a given AGL 
experiment are best illustrated using the pictorial representation of 
Figure 1. This is the simplest representation for an artificial gram-
mar, or a finite state language. The circles with the numbers are 
the states of the grammar. Every time a transition is made between 
states, the symbol corresponding to this transition is added (in 
Figure 1 these symbols are letters), until a transition is made to 
one of the OUT states. Since not all transitions are possible, the G 
stimuli are usually only a small subset of the possible strings that can 
be created using the same set of symbols. Note, that a researcher is 
not restricted to creating letter strings using a finite state language; 
the letters corresponding to the different transitions in Figure 1 
can be replaced by arbitrary symbols (for AGL with stimuli other 
than letter strings see Altmann et al., 1995; Whittlesea and Wright, 
1997; Pothos and Bailey, 2000; Pothos et al., 2006).
In a typical AGL experiment, participants are first presented 
with a subset of the G stimuli and they are simply told to observe 
them. Subsequently, in test, they are told that all the stimuli they 
saw in the first part were consistent with a particular set of rules and 
that they are about to see a set of new stimuli that either comply 
or violate these rules; their task would be to identify the stimuli 
that comply to the rules. A robust finding is that participants can 
identify with above chance accuracy the test G items from the NG 
ones. Note that this is far from a trivial observation, since, for all we 
know, participants might just as well have been inclined to select 
as grammatical the NG items in test. Also, another robust finding 
is that participants often have difficulty articulating the knowl-
edge on the basis of which they made their item selections in test 
(Tunney and Shanks, 2003; Dienes and Scott, 2005; Tunney, 2005; 
Scott and Dienes, 2008).
The utility of AGL for the study of generalization can be prima-
rily seen in two ways. Firstly, there has been a very long tradition 
of similar experiments, so that possible confoundings and the type 
of manipulations that may affect performance are relatively well 
understood (e.g., see Redington and Chater, 1996 or Tunney and 
Altmann, 1999). In this way, the likelihood of artifactual findings 
or invalid interpretation of results are reduced. Secondly, perform-
ance on an AGL task is potentially compatible with several different 
learning processes, involving rules, similarity, fragment informa-
tion, and so forth (see below). By using sensitive enough statistical 
procedures, one can investigate in AGL the relative importance and 
interaction of several different hypotheses for learning (Johnstone 
and Shanks, 1999; Pothos and Bailey, 2000; Lotz et al., 2009). In 
point of fact, there are very few experimental paradigms that allow 
the simultaneous investigation of such a diverse range of possible 
hypotheses as are applicable in AGL.
StAndArd hypotheSeS for Agl
The original claim by Reber (e.g., Reber and Allen, 1978) has been 
that during training subjects acquired an abstract representation 
of the rule system underlying the G items and that on the basis 
of this knowledge they were able to identify with above chance 
accuracy the G stimuli in the test part. In fact, this proposal has 
been entirely abandoned, including by its own proponent (in Reber, 
1993). However, more realistic rule accounts of AGL have been 
put forward. For example, Dulany et al. (1984, 1985) suggested 
that participants acquire “correlated grammars”, that is approxi-
mations of the underlying grammar, which may, however, include 
inaccurate rules. Such correlated grammars have been interpreted 
as basically a collection of explicit tests of which items are legal or 
not (cf. Ashby et al., 1998).
Other accounts have invoked similarity as the driving force in 
grammaticality decisions. For instance, Brooks and Vokey have 
suggested that an item would be as likely to be endorsed as G if 
it is actually G, as when it is more similar to the training items, 
with similarity operationalized in terms of ease of transforma-
tion (Brooks and Vokey, 1991; Vokey and Brooks, 1992; cf. Hahn 
et al., 2003). Pothos and Bailey (2000) employed an alternative 
exemplar similarity approach, by applying an exemplar categori-
zation model in AGL (Nosofsky’s generalized context model; e.g., 
Nosofsky, 1988a,b). An alternative approach is to suggest that it 
is not the entire exemplar which affects perceptions of similar-
ity in AGL, but rather the pattern of repeating elements (i.e., 
the identical symbols in a sequence). Such a hypothesis appears 
very plausible, and has seen particularly supported in the context 
of transfer AGL experiments (Altmann et al., 1995; Tunney and 
Altmann, 1999).
Associative learning theory can be applied in AGL through the 
examination of the structures that can develop if the learning proc-
ess involves associations between elementary symbols. Perruchet 
and Pacteau (1990; also Perruchet et al., 1992; Perruchet, 1994) 
argued that the knowledge acquired in an AGL experiment is best 
characterized in terms of the pairs (bigrams) or triplets (trigrams) 
of letters learned during training. This view was later extended by 
Knowlton and Squire (1994, 1996; see also Meulemans and Van 
der Linden, 1997, and Servan-Schreiber and Anderson, 1990), who 
computed various measures of fragment (i.e., bigrams or trigrams) 
overlap between test and training items. Finally, there have been 
several successful connectionist models of AGL (e.g., Cleeremans 
and McClelland, 1991; Dienes, 1992).
Figure 1 | This is the grammar used in Knowlton and Squire (1996, exp. 
1), as well as in Pothos and Bailey (2000), whose results are analyzed in 
this work. From Pothos and Bailey (2000), published by APA. Reprinted with 
permission.
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encounters, even though it may be informationally inefficient in 
any  particular single learning problem (which could correspond to 
AGL). Indeed, there have been several proposals for learning involv-
ing multiple systems, such that each system is tuned to a particular 
type of problem (e.g., Ashby et al., 1998; Maddox et al., 2004; Sun 
et al., 2005). The converse hypothesis would be that the cognitive 
system may always be biased to simply pursue the informationally 
most efficient strategy in a learning situation and, as it happens, 
this strategy will correlate to a greater or lesser extent with (say) 
strategies based on rules or similarity in particular situations. Note 
that in AGL, and as is the case with all tasks of inductive inference, 
there are no correct or wrong answers, so that at best we can only 
say that a particular learning strategy is adaptive or maladaptive 
(i.e., we cannot label a learning strategy as “correct”).
So, ultimately, the theoretical question relates to what is the 
fundamental way of understanding human learning, whether we 
should aim to do so in terms of learning systems based on similar-
ity/rules/associations or whether we should look to the Information 
Premise and corresponding entropy-based models. However, at a 
more practical and immediately relevant level, we do not know at 
this point how much the various existing AGL hypotheses (e.g., 
chunking models) are informationally efficient. This is an open 
and interesting issue and addressing it is one of the objectives of 
the present research.
An entropy model for Agl
We have discussed at length the possible relation of entropy mini-
mization with other AGL accounts, such as rules and similarity. A 
slight complication is that there is no single best way to provide 
an entropy-based model. Alternative schemes can differ in terms 
of their assumptions regarding the elementary units involved in 
learning, which in turn affects the entropy computations. The 
main assumption in this work concerns how stimuli are processed. 
Following the work of Perruchet and Pacteau (1990) and Knowlton 
and Squire (1994), it is assumed that stimuli are processed prima-
rily in terms of their bigrams and trigrams, so that participants’ 
knowledge is basically limited to bigrams and trigrams (includ-
ing information about anchor positions). The reason why such an 
assumption is useful here is that it allows a straightforward scheme 
for computing the entropy of a particular test item, relative to the 
training items. After we have described the entropy model of AGL, 
we will briefly consider some alternative related approaches in AGL, 
so as to evaluate the present proposal.
At a broad level, in AGL in the test phase decisions can be 
thought of as judgments of compatibility: That is, participants 
are told that some test items are “compatible” with the training 
items, and that their task is to identify which are these. Entropy 
can provide a principled formal way to quantify compatibility: It is 
suggested that each test item is given a complexity measure accord-
ing to how “specifiable” it is from training items. This complexity 
measure is computed by dividing the item into parts, and seeing 
how “determinable” the continuation from each of these parts is on 
the basis of information from training. Such a scheme is consistent 
with Miller’s (1958) early work on quantifying the redundancy in 
strings of letters (in fact, his pioneering experiment was the pred-
ecessor to the very first AGL experiment ever, that of Reber, 1967). 
It is also similar in principle to simple recurrent network models 
How mutually exclusive are the models presented above? With 
careful theoretical work, not to mention very precise stimulus 
construction, it can be argued that ultimately the above mod-
els do involve distinct hypotheses about AGL, corresponding to 
(broadly) rules, exemplar similarity, or fragment overlap (the 
latter can be interpreted in terms of feature-based similarity or 
associative learning; Pothos, 2007). In practice, there is consider-
able overlap between the predictions from different models, even 
though it is possible to create stimulus sets which reflect (approxi-
mately) orthogonal influences of two or more performance fac-
tors. To briefly review some relevant results, Vokey and Brooks 
(1992) reported independent influences of grammaticality and 
exemplar similarity on participants’ performance and Knowlton 
and Squire (1994, 1996) found independent influences of gram-
maticality and fragment overlap. Regression analysis investigations 
by Johnstone and Shanks (1999) and Pothos and Bailey (2000) 
further confirmed that most AGL hypotheses all appear to be valid, 
to some extent, but that there is also considerable overlap between 
the corresponding predictions.
How much should we be concerned by the overlap between the 
predictions of different AGL models? Overall, the degree of overlap 
between different theoretical constructs is a hotly debated issue 
(Pothos, 2005a). For example, some investigators consider con-
nectionist and rules proposals of linguistic processing as mutually 
exclusive (e.g., Marcus et al., 1995). Other researchers, by contrast, 
have considered such proposals as potentially compatible, but from 
different viewpoints (cf. Marr, 1982; Dienes, 1992). For example, a 
connectionist model would be more about an explanation of the 
mechanistic processes involved in language, while the rules would 
be more about the representations formed and the relevant opera-
tions on these representations. In such a case, overlap between the 
connectionist and the rules model would simply affect our percep-
tion of how both models ought to be interpreted.
In this vein, in developing an entropy model for AGL, we can 
consider how much we a priori require this model to lead to dis-
tinct performance predictions from alternative models of AGL. 
Fundamentally, an entropy model of AGL and its reliance on the 
Information Premise involve hypotheses about AGL regarding 
the extent to which the cognitive system processes efficiently the 
available statistical structure in a set of observed stimuli (Chater, 
1996, 1999). It is a trivial statement to point out that the cognitive 
system must involve processes which take advantage of the rich 
statistical regularity in our environment. Indeed, some psycholo-
gists have explored the extent to which the structure of the envi-
ronment determines cognitive function (Shepard, 1992). Equally, 
most cognitive models can be seen as hypotheses of exactly how 
the cognitive system processes environmental structure. So, what 
is special about Shannon entropy?
The point about Shannon entropy is that this is a generic, or 
theory neutral, measure of statistical structure. In other words, 
it is a measure of structure in information, but which does not 
involve a particular hypothesis of what is the form of this structure. 
And here is the nub of the problem. One hypothesis is that the 
cognitive system may be set up to process information in terms of 
looking for rules or learning whole exemplars. Presumably, if the 
cognitive system does adopt such a strategy, it must be adaptive 
across the range of learning problems the cognitive system typically 
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have a very small impact on performance (a subtlety arises if in 
test the ratio of eX’s to eY’s changes from training to test, however, 
this issue is beyond the scope of the present work). This example 
highlights the fact that the entropy computations reflect the uncer-
tainty in continuing from a symbol (in a familiar way), neither the 
frequency of a bigram nor the conditional probability of a second 
symbol given the first one. Thus, the entropy model of AGL is a 
departure from standard intuitions regarding how to quantify the 
distributional information from training in an AGL task.
So, when faced with a familiar bigram in a test item, the model 
examines the uncertainty in having one particular continuation 
from the first symbol to the second, based on the statistics of the 
training set. But what happens when the bigram had not been 
observed in training? In such a case, the distributional informa-
tion from training cannot help. Accordingly, we suggest that the 
corresponding entropy is computed by assuming that all possible 
continuations from the first symbol to the second are equiprob-
able. Continuing with the above example, once we have com-
puted S(eX), we subsequently need to compute S(XY), S(YZ), and 
S(Ze). But, bigram XY has never been observed in training and 
so the information from training cannot reduce the uncertainty 
 regarding possible continuations from symbol X. In such a case, I 
suggest that S XY( ) { / log / }= − ⋅ =1 4 1 4 4 22 . Note that we are assum-
ing that any symbol can have four possible and equiprobable 
continuations, X, Y, Z, and e. An alternative possibility would be to 
compute S(XY) for an unfamiliar bigram XY in terms of the base 
probabilities of symbols X and Y. However, there is no evidence 
in AGL that such base probabilities play a role in performance. 
Moreover, such an approach would have difficulty when it comes 
to symbols in test which have never been encountered in train-
ing. Having said this, it certainly appears worthwhile in future 
work to explore alternative schemes for computing the entropy 
of unseen items.
More formally, we can express the entropy model for AGL in the 
following way: regarding a bigram S
i
S
k
 which has been observed 
in training,
S S S
S S
Si k
i l
i
bigram
frequency
numberof all bigramswith first
= = −( )
l
N
i l
i
S S
S
=∑
×
1
2log ,
frequency
numberof all bigramswith first
where N is simply the number of distinct symbols including the end 
symbol, e. If bigram S
i
S
k
 has not been observed in training, then 
S S S
N Ni k l
N
bigram( ) log .= − =∑ 1 121
Note that we have used the index “bigram” for the above entropy 
calculations. A very similar scheme is possible for longer item frag-
ments. In this work we consider entropy measures for bigrams and 
trigrams. Regarding the latter, the question is, given a particular 
bigram, how much uncertainty is there in determining the next 
symbol. More specifically, if in test we encounter a trigram XYZ 
that has been observed in training, the entropy for determining Z 
given the bigram XY can be computed by considering all possible 
trigrams such that XY are the first two symbols. If the trigram had 
not been observed in training, then, given bigram XY, all we can say 
of AGL, whereby the objective is to predict the next symbol in a 
sequence (e.g., Boucher and Dienes, 2003), although note that the 
entropy measure quantifies the ease of prediction, without regard 
of the actual fragments which are high or low frequency. We next 
describe in detail the present proposal.
First, each test string is broken down into all constituent bigrams 
and trigrams, including the anchors (that is, the beginning and 
end points). Letting symbols “b” and “e” stand for the beginning 
and the end of a string, test string MSV would be broken into the 
bigrams (bM, MS, SV, Ve) and into the trigrams (bMS, MSV, SVe). 
Note that we are assuming that a string of symbols (this is the 
traditional form of AGL stimuli) is processed from left to right. 
In situations in which it cannot be assumed that strings are read 
from left to right, one would expect the entropy model of AGL to 
do less well (this is something which will be assessed directly later 
on). These bigrams and trigrams will be less or more familiar on 
the basis of the information observed during the training phase. 
In standard fragment hypotheses for AGL, fragment familiarity 
is typically quantified as frequency, so that a fragment would be 
more familiar if it has been observed with a higher frequency in 
training. Here, we do something different: following Miller (1958), 
in observing a particular sequence of symbols, we ask how much 
uncertainty is there in recognizing this sequence as familiar from 
training. The Information Premise suggests that the less the uncer-
tainty, the greater the ease with which a test item will be recognized, 
and so the greater the likelihood that it will be considered G.
As an example, let’s say that a participant is exposed to 
strings XXX, XXX, YYY in training and XYZ in test. In encod-
ing the test item, the first bigram eX has been observed at least 
once in training, so we can ask how familiar it is. Using the 
equation for Shannon entropy, Entropy = −
=∑ p pii
N
i1 2
log , 
S eX p pi i( ) log / log / / log / .= − = − − =∑ 2 2 22 3 2 3 1 3 1 3 0 92 , s i n c e 
the continuation from the first symbol can be either an X with a 
probability of 2/3 or a Y with a probability of 1/3. In other words, 
S(eX) refers to the uncertainty in recognizing a particular continu-
ation from symbol e, as familiar on the basis of the information 
from the training phase. The less the uncertainty, the greater the 
determinism in continuing from one symbol in a particular way 
(i.e., one can identify a particular continuation amongst alterna-
tives more easily). To illustrate, if instead of XXX, XXX, YYY, we 
had an equal number of XXX’s and YYY’s, there would be a greater 
uncertainty in discriminating between possible continuations from 
e, and S(eX) = 1. But, say we had 99 XXX’s and only one YYY, then 
there would be a greatly reduced uncertainty, S(eX) = 0.08. In such 
a case, we would readily recognize as familiar a bigram eX, even if 
we occasionally expect the odd eY. Indeed, if there have been 99 
eX’s and only one eY, it might be the case that the exception is as 
memorable as the rule, leading to an interesting prediction from 
the entropy model.
Note that this scheme implies that S(eX) = S(eY), for the above 
training and test items. In other words, if someone is trained with 99 
X’s and only one Y, according to the entropy approach, this means 
that both eX and eY continuations are less complex/easier to parse, 
and so they would be considered equally familiar. This assumption 
is less counterintuitive than it seems: If there have been 99 X’s and 
only one Y in training, then this means that eY continuations are 
simply much less likely, so that the rare occurrences of eY would 
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are distinct from simple probabilistic measures as well. Suppose, 
for example, that a participant sees in training items XY, XY, XZ. 
Then P(Y|X) = 2/3 and P(Z|X) = 1/3. But, suppose now that the 
participant sees four XYs, one XZ, and one XQ. Then, it is still the 
case that P(Y|X) = 2/3, but now we also have and P(Z|X) = 1/6, 
P(Q|X) = 1/6. So, according to a conditional probability approach, 
the continuation Y from item X would be equally salient, regard-
less of the information in the other training items. By contrast, the 
bigram entropy in the first case would be 0.92 and in the second 
case 1.25. In other words, according to the entropy model for AGL, 
the salience of a bigram does not depend only on its frequency but 
also on the overall context of what other relevant bigrams have 
been observed as well.
relAted propoSAlS
The idea of using entropy to understand AGL performance is not 
new. Jamieson and Mewhort (2005) examined the overall redun-
dancy of a particular finite state language. They did this by consid-
ering −Σp
ij
 log
2
 p
ij
 , in which p
ij
 denotes the probability of symbol j 
following symbol i in a sequence. Clearly, the fewer the equiprobable 
“branches” in a finite state language, the lower this particular entropy 
measure and, so, the more redundant the corresponding finite state 
language. Jamieson and Mewhort (2005) computed a redundancy 
index for a finite state language by comparing its redundancy with 
the redundancy of an equivalent but entirely unconstrained finite 
state language. Jamieson and Mewhort’s redundancy index is based 
on the same computation for entropy as that in Miller (1958) and 
the present proposal. However, while the present proposal aims to 
derive an entropy measure for individual test items in an AGL task, 
Jamieson and Mewhort wanted to determine the overall redundancy 
of a grammar. A priori, for Jamieson and Mewhort’s measure to be 
psychologically relevant, participants must have acquired enough 
knowledge of the finite state language after being exposed to the 
training items, for the entropy computations for the entire gram-
mar to be accurate. This seems unlikely and, indeed, Jamieson and 
Mewhort’s analyses did not support the redundancy index. Instead, 
they found support for what they called a measure of “local redun-
dancy”, computed as the number of alternative sequences which 
can be generated by re-arranging the symbols of a particular test 
sequence. This alternative measure is based on straightforward com-
binatorics, rather than a formal definition of redundancy (through 
entropy) as such. But, in any case, Jamieson and Mewhort’s research 
provides some important boundary conditions on how entropy can 
be used in understanding AGL performance.
Poletiek and van Schijndel (2009) examined what they called 
the statistical coverage of a grammar, the idea being that different 
items will provide more information about the underlying finite 
state language than other items. Their basis for understanding AGL 
performance was a measure of the probability for a test item, which 
was computed in terms of the probabilities of the transitions in the 
finite state language which would be required to produce the item. 
With the additional assumption that all transitions are equiprob-
able, this measure predicts that in general longer items would be 
less probable than shorter items. This is no doubt an interesting 
measure but, as with the case of Jamieson and Mewhort’s (2005) 
redundancy measure, it does assume that the underlying finite 
state grammar is psychologically relevant. In other work by the 
regarding the following symbol is that all symbols are equiprobable. 
Extending this scheme to four-grams is not viable given existing 
AGL designs: there are too many distinct four-grams and trigrams 
to make the scheme meaningful.
We have so far considered the entropy for continuing from a 
single symbol or a bigram. How can this entropy lead to a measure 
for the overall entropy of a test item? Note that, given the latter, 
we would want to assume that the less the overall entropy associ-
ated with a string, the more familiar the string would be, given 
the statistical information from training, and so the more likely 
the string would be to be endorsed as grammatical. In general, 
a string would have a lower overall entropy if it is made up from 
such symbols (and bigrams) such that there is very low uncer-
tainty in how they should be continued. We explore two possible 
ways for combining individual symbol (and bigram) entropies. 
According to a summative approach, the overall bigram entropy 
of a test item would be the sum of all entropies for continuing 
from individual symbols and the overall trigram entropy would the 
sum of all entropies for continuing from individual bigrams. Note 
immediately that this summative approach predicts that longer 
items would be more likely to be associated with a higher entropy. 
It is in fact true that there is an association between item length 
and grammaticality endorsement (e.g., Pothos and Bailey, 2000). 
This summative approach is also normatively more correct, if one 
interprets entropy as the number of binary questions required to 
identify a particular element. However, it is possible that partici-
pants are more influenced by individual particularly surprising or 
particularly familiar bigrams (or trigrams; cf. Dulany et al., 1984). 
Accordingly, it is worth exploring an averaging approach as well, 
according to which the overall bigram entropy of an item is the 
average of all the entropies for continuing from individual symbols 
and the overall trigram entropy of an item is the average of all the 
entropies for continuing from individual bigrams. Such an averag-
ing approach is broadly consistent with other AGL proposals based 
on fragmentary information. For example, both Knowlton and 
Squire (1994, 1996) and Meulemans and van der Linden (1997) 
proposed their well-known measures of associative strength as aver-
ages of the corresponding bigrams or trigrams.
In sum, the entropy measures for AGL are about quantifying 
the expected difficulty of a continuation, either from a symbol or a 
bigram, given what has been observed in training. If for a particular 
test item, it is easy to guess all continuations from individual sym-
bols or bigrams, then the overall (summative or average) entropy 
of the item will be low and the item should be more likely to be 
selected as grammatical – this is an application of the Information 
Premise in AGL. Note that in the above there is no claim regard-
ing the actual cognitive process via which these computations are 
carried out; rather, it is suggested that psychological judgments of 
compatibility are made in a way that is consistent with the above 
computations (in other words, the model is a representation model, 
but not a process one; e.g., cf. van de Helm and Leeuwenberg, 1996). 
The proposed entropy measures are clearly different from standard 
measures of chunk strength, since, according to the latter, the higher 
the frequency of a bigram, the higher its corresponding chunk 
strength. By contrast, the entropy measures take into account not 
just the absolute frequency of a bigram or trigram, but critically the 
number of competing alternative options. The entropy measures 
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mar, grammaticality is still employed as a convenient index of 
AGL performance. Moreover, there are alternative hypotheses for 
what is learned in AGL based on rules, which involve more realistic 
assumptions about psychological representation (e.g., Dulany et al., 
1984).
The second measure to be included was the global associative 
strength one of Knowlton and Squire (1994, 1996). This is a meas-
ure with a solid theoretical motivation (either as feature overlap 
or in terms of basic associative learning processes) and it has been 
explored in several AGL studies (e.g., Higham, 1997; Meulemans 
and van der Linden, 1997; Johnstone and Shanks, 1999; Pothos 
and Bailey, 2000; Lotz et al., 2009). Each test item has a global 
associative strength value, which is the average of the associative 
strength of all its bigrams and trigrams. The associative strength 
of a bigram or trigram is simply the average frequency with which 
it has been observed in training. For example, in computing the 
anchor associative chunk strength of string MSXVVR, we need to 
consider how frequently the following chunks appeared in training: 
MS, MSX, VR, VVR. A third measure, related to global associative 
strength, is anchor associative strength (e.g., see Knowlton and 
Squire, 1994, or Meulemans and van der Linden, 1997). The anchor 
associative chunk strength of a test item is computed in the same 
way as the global chunk strength, but taking into account only 
the bigrams and trigrams in the anchor positions of a string (the 
beginning and end of a string). The theoretical motivation for the 
anchor measure relates to the empirical finding that anchor chunks 
tend to be more salient to participants. For example, participants 
are more likely to identify NG strings if they violate the rules of 
the underlying finite state language in the anchor position (e.g., 
Reber and Allen, 1978).
Fourth, the edit distance of each test item was computed. The 
edit distance between two items is the number of changes that need 
to occur in one item so that it becomes identical to the other item. 
Specifically, edit distance was defined as the number of insertions 
and deletions that are required to map one item to another, such 
that substitutions were considered as an insertion and a deletion. 
Brooks and Vokey (1991) first employed edit distance in the study 
of AGL and since then it has been considered a measure of whole 
exemplar similarity, that is, a measure of how much the classifica-
tion of a test item is influenced by its similarity to entire training 
instances (see Hahn et al., 2003, for a general model of similar-
ity based on transformations). Thus, edit distance is aligned to 
exemplar theories of categorization (e.g., Nosofsky, 1988a) and 
represents a way to understand similarity in AGL that is alternative 
to chunk strength (for a discussion see Pothos, 2007). However, 
Brooks and Vokey (1991) computed the edit distance of each test 
item relative to a single training item (the one most similar to the 
test item). So, in a sense, Brooks and Vokey employed a “nearest 
neighbor” version of exemplar theory. Psychologically, there is not 
really any evidence for such nearest neighbor exemplar processes 
(unless one considers very extreme values of the sensitivity param-
eter in the generalized context model; Nosofsky, 1988a,b, but such 
situations have not been researched in any detail). Accordingly, 
and following Pothos and Bailey (2000), we adopted the more 
standard approach of calculating an edit distance value for each 
test item as the average edit distance between the test item and 
all training items.
same group, van den Bos and Poletiek (2008) computed a measure 
called dependency length, which can be broadly understood as the 
number of symbols required before the current symbol in a test item 
can be determined. Overall, the work of Poletiek et al. highlights 
the fact that in attempting to specify a psychological measure of 
complexity, there are several choices other than entropy.
Note that one of the key assumptions in the present model con-
cerns how to code for entirely novel sequences. But this issue does 
not come up at all in the proposals of Jamieson and Mewhort (2005), 
Miller (1958), and Poletiek and van Schijndel (2009). In the former 
models, an overall measure for the redundancy of the grammar is 
computed, partly on the basis of the number of sequences which 
can be generated by a grammar in relation to the total number of 
possible sequences. In the latter proposal, statistical coverage is 
computed as a property of training exemplars together, so the issue 
of unseen sequences does not affect the calculations.
Most related to the current proposal is previous work by Pothos 
and Bailey (1999). These investigators computed an entropy meas-
ure for each test item by taking into account the uncertainty of 
continuing the item in a standard forward (left to right) and 
reverse direction. For example, the entropy of test item ABCD 
would be a function (sum or average) of S(eA), S(eAB), S(eABC), 
and S(eABCD) in the forward direction, where the S measures are 
computed by taking into account the uncertainty in determining 
the particular continuation. Despite encouraging results, there 
is an important a priori problem with this proposal. It assumes 
that participants can take into account information regarding 
all previous symbols in trying to predict the next symbol in a 
sequence. Such an assumption seems to go against empirical 
observation. In AGL, the current evidence suggests that at most 
participants learn up to trigram information (see Pothos, 2007, 
for an  overview). Moreover, when participants do learn informa-
tion about larger fragments, this is typically achieved only after 
an extensive amount of training (Cleeremans and McClelland, 
1991). Note that this issue concerns the largest fragment par-
ticipants can learn about starting from individual symbols and 
does not preclude a mode of learning based on the processing of 
entire exemplars (as has been clearly demonstrated in AGL; for 
example, Vokey and Brooks, 1994).
mAterIAlS And methodS
other meASureS
Most measures of AGL performance are based on some aspect of the 
statistical information available in training or the underlying gram-
mar and, so, as pointed out, it is hardly surprising that they often 
correlate in practice (e.g., Johnstone and Shanks, 1999; Pothos and 
Bailey, 2000). Moreover, it has been argued above that in principle 
the entropy model can lead to predictions distinct from models 
based on, say, bigram or trigram frequency, but it is of course an 
empirical issue as to how much overlap there is in specific cases of 
empirical importance. To better understand the properties of the 
entropy model, we can examine it in relation to a few prominent 
measures for what is learned in AGL.
First, I considered the grammaticality of the test items, that is 
whether they are G or NG, according to the rules of the underly-
ing finite state grammar. While most investigators today reject a 
hypothesis for AGL based on knowledge of the underlying gram-
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stimulus sets balancing different performance factors, researchers 
have developed automated computational procedures for creat-
ing such stimulus sets (e.g., Bailey and Pothos, 2008). Overall, the 
Reber and Allen (1978) and Knowlton and Squire (1996, Exp. 1) 
grammars are probably not the most sophisticated grammars a 
researcher could use today. However, they are “standard” in the 
sense that they have been employed in several studies and research-
ers fairly familiar with their properties.
The particular datasets which will be analyzed are those of 
Pothos et al. (2006) and Pothos and Bailey (2000). Pothos et al. 
(2006) used the Reber and Allen (1978) grammar and manipulated 
stimulus format so that in one condition stimuli appeared as letter 
strings (as is standard), in another condition as sequences of cities 
which corresponded to the routes of an airline company, and in a 
final condition stimuli were embedded arrangements of shapes (the 
first symbol in a sequence corresponded to the inner-most shape 
and subsequent symbols enclosed all previous ones; Figure 2). The 
manipulation of stimulus format was employed to examine the 
extent to which AGL is about learning at the symbolic level or 
whether stimulus format affects learning processes. From this and 
other research it appears that stimulus format does affect learning 
to some extent, although it has not been possible to make this intui-
tion more precise (see also, e.g., Altmann et al., 1995; Whittlesea 
and Wright, 1997). Also, Pothos et al. (2006) included a transfer 
manipulation, so that in three conditions the same symbols were 
used to specify both training and test stimuli, but in three additional 
conditions the symbols were changed after test.
Pothos and Bailey (2000) employed the Knowlton and Squire 
(1996, Exp. 1; see also Figure 1) grammar and also provided a 
manipulation of stimulus format. In one condition Pothos and 
Bailey employed embedded arrangements of shapes analogous to 
those of Pothos et al. (2006). In another condition, the stimuli were 
made of the same shapes, but now sequentially arranged. In the 
third condition stimuli were arrangements of line segments. In that 
condition each symbol (that is, each transition in the underlying 
finite state language) corresponded to an angle relative to the previ-
ous symbol. This means that the same symbol could result to adding 
The last, and least interesting, performance measure to be 
included in the analyses is the length of the items. For example, it 
is possible that smaller items are better remembered, so that it is 
easier for participants to decide whether they are G or NG in the 
test phase. Length has not really been examined in detail in the AGL 
literature, although some of the better-motivated models do actu-
ally covary quite a lot with length (e.g., Poletiek and van Schijndel, 
2009). A theoretical interpretation of AGL competence on the basis 
of length as such is, of course, uninteresting, although if length 
can account for variance in grammaticality selections, then maybe 
alternative explanations for AGL performance ought to be pursued 
(possibly based more explicitly on memory processes).
grAmmArS
The possible equivalence (or not) between different putative meas-
ures of AGL performance is usually meaningfully defined only in 
the context of particular finite state languages (there may be trivial 
cases whereby one measure is a simple transformation of another, 
so that they would always covary regardless of the grammar). In 
this work, I consider the grammars (and particular sets of training, 
test items) employed by Reber and Allen (1978) and Knowlton and 
Squire (1996, Exp. 1). The Reber and Allen (1978) study is one of the 
early pioneering AGL studies and the corresponding grammar has 
been a focal point for much of the subsequent debate about what is 
learned in AGL (e.g., see Dulany et al., 1984; Perruchet and Pacteau, 
1990; Redington and Chater, 1996). Reber and Allen’s (1978) gram-
mar involves 20 training items and 50 test items, 25 of which are 
G and 25 NG. An interesting aspect of this stimulus set is that the 
NG items were created so as to reflect different kinds of violations 
(e.g., a violation in the first position vs. a deep violation vs. legal 
strings spelt backwards). Also, the test G items were not all unique 
(as has become standard in later AGL studies), rather five items were 
repeated from training (this was done so as to examine whether 
performance on novel G items was as good as with repeated G ones). 
However, the Reber and Allen grammar only manipulated gram-
maticality – the test items were not balanced with respect to any 
other performance measure. This, indeed, has been a starting point 
for considerable debate in AGL, as other researchers argued that 
it was not grammaticality as such that allowed the successful dis-
crimination between G and NG sequences in test, but rather some 
other performance factors, such as similarity. Speaking of which, 
Knowlton and Squire (1994, 1996) provided the most principled 
approach to modeling fragment overlap in AGL. In their 1996 study, 
they created a grammar (shown in Figure 1), which carefully bal-
anced grammaticality against global chunk strength (though note 
that the Knowlton and Squire materials as reported in their paper 
actually have typos; see, e.g., Pothos and Bailey, 2000). Specifically, 
the training set of Knowlton and Squire (1996, Exp. 1) consisted 
of 23 training items and 32 unique test items. There were 16 G test 
items and 16 NG. Importantly, the average global chunk strength of 
the G items was equated to that of the NG items (this equivalence 
was established in terms of non-significant t-tests). Thus, Knowlton 
and Squire could examine independently the putative influence of 
grammaticality and chunk strength in participants’ performance. 
They reported effects for both, a result broadly replicated in sub-
sequent research. Finally, it is worth noting that since the work of 
Knowlton and Squire (and that of Vokey and Brooks, 1991) with 
Figure 2 | examples of the types of stimuli used in Pothos et al. (2006).
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line segments at different angles to the horizontal, depending on 
which other lines have preceded the current one (Figure 3). The 
lines stimuli in particular challenge any model which is sensitive 
only to the underlying symbolic structure of the stimuli, regardless 
of the particular format of the stimuli.
prelImInAry conSIderAtIonS
We adopted the simple strategy of examining correlations between 
the entropy measures and the other predictors of AGL performance 
and between the entropy measures and grammaticality endorse-
ments in the nine conditions of Pothos et al. (2006) and Pothos 
and Bailey (2000). The grammaticality endorsement of a test item 
is the probability with which is selected as grammatical. The pre-
diction regarding the entropy measures is that grammaticality 
 endorsements should correlate negatively with the entropy meas-
ures, in the simple sense that the more specifiable a test item is from 
the training items, the more it should be perceived to be compatible 
with the test items, and hence as G (note, though, that one cannot 
formulate an a priori prediction as to whether the bigram or the 
trigram version of the entropy measures will work better and like-
wise for the summative and averaging versions). Modeling gram-
maticality endorsements presents a sensitive test of any AGL model 
since there are (number of items minus one) degrees of freedom, 
while the model restricts only one degree of freedom.
Before presenting the results, it is worth bearing in mind both 
the possible sources of error in the application of the entropy model 
for AGL and its inherent limitations. First, the model’s predictions 
are based only on the symbolic-level regularity of the AGL stimuli. 
How much of AGL performance can we understand by considering 
regularity only at the symbolic level? Note that all the AGL proposals 
which were reviewed above make no allowances for differences in 
stimulus format. As said above, it is unlikely that stimulus format does 
not affect AGL performance at all, even though attempts to quantify 
any corresponding effects have had limited success (e.g., Pothos et al., 
2006). Second, some learning is bound to take place in the test phase 
of an AGL experiment as well. AGL research has identified situations 
where participants given only the test phase of an AGL experiment, 
perform in similar ways to participants given both the test and the 
training phases. In an ideal situation, we would be modeling gram-
maticality endorsements in test after all variability due to learning 
that can take place in test has been eliminated. However, it has not 
been possible to corresponding procedures. Third, grammaticality 
endorsements are noisy. In this work, we adopt the simplifying pro-
cedure of considering the average endorsement rate for each test item 
across participants (within conditions). Traditionally, in AGL work 
the dependent variable of interest has been overall grammaticality 
accuracy. Power analyses with such a variable indicate that popula-
tion samples of between 15 and 30 participants to be adequate (e.g., 
Pothos, 2005b). However, investigations on grammaticality endorse-
ments have been less frequent (Pothos and Bailey, 2000; Johnstone 
and Shanks, 1999; Lotz et al., 2009) and corresponding power analy-
ses have not been conducted.
reSultS And dIScuSSIon
In Table 1 we show how the four entropy measures correlated with 
average grammaticality endorsements in the nine AGL conditions 
of Pothos et al. (2006) and Pothos and Bailey (2000). Negative 
correlations are in the expected direction, in the sense that greater 
complexity is associated with a lower endorsement rate for the 
corresponding item. One may get the impression that different 
entropy measures work better in different situations. However, in 
the absence of clear theoretical reasons as to why different meas-
ures should perform better in different cases, we should be careful 
before drawing any conclusions. In order to appreciate the quali-
tative pattern of results, I summed the correlations between the 
entropy measures and grammaticality endorsements for the no 
transfer and transfer conditions separately. These sums have no 
statistical meaning, they are just a convenient descriptive way to 
talk about the results. Regarding the no transfer results, the average 
trigram entropy performed best (sum: −2.83), followed by the aver-
age bigram entropy (sum: −1.9), followed by the summed trigram 
entropy (−1.7), with the summed bigram entropy being last (sum: 
0.69). In fact, the pattern for the transfer results was identical.
A few immediate conclusions are possible. First, it appears that 
average trigram entropy is a fair model of AGL performance. In five 
out of six no transfer conditions, there was a significant correlation 
between average trigram entropy and grammaticality endorsements. 
Though note that the correlations between the entropy measures 
and grammaticality endorsements did not exceed 0.69. At the very 
least, this suggests that the entropy model in its current form is 
incomplete. One obvious limitation is that it assumes entropy com-
putations are noiseless and that they lead to a criterion for item 
endorsement which is likewise noiseless. Future extensions without 
these assumptions, and possibly incorporating some kind of diffu-
sion decision process (e.g., Pleskac and Busemeyer, in press), appear 
promising. Also, regarding the transfer conditions, the correlations 
were not significant, even though they were in the right direction. 
Second, for both bigram and trigram entropies, the average version 
was associated with higher correlations with performance than the 
corresponding summed version. This finding indicates that par-
ticipants are not sensitive to the overall complexity in parsing a test 
item, but rather to the average complexity of all bigrams/trigrams 
in the test item.
Figure 3 | examples of the types of stimuli used in Pothos and Bailey 
(2000).
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intuition as to why such repetition measures work in the transfer 
AGL paradigm: they depend on patterns of identity, irrespective 
of particular symbols. Observe that the entropy model should be 
blind to repetition structure, as it is only sensitive to the number 
of alternative continuations from one symbol to the next, irrespec-
tive of whether these continuations involve identical symbols or 
not. To conclude with this issue, a repetition structure approach 
has some obvious strengths especially when it comes to transfer 
experiments. Though note, it is currently difficult to unequivocally 
conclude that such an approach is superior to alternative ones (and 
indeed, e.g., Scott and Dienes, 2008, did not examine the relation 
of the repetition structure indices with the other measures of AGL 
performance they considered).
Table 1 also compares the correlations between  grammaticality 
endorsements and the entropy measures with the correlations involving 
the other AGL measures. Note that we could not compare the perform-
ance measures with multiple regression analyses for two reasons. First, 
because of the large number of predictors, we would likely end up with 
saturated models, so that there would be reduced evidence that the stand-
ardized beta coefficients are significantly different from zero. Second, the 
different predictors correlate highly with each other (see Table 2) and a 
situation of colinearity would further reduce confidence in the relative 
size of the beta coefficients. Overall, the only AGL performance measure 
which appears clearly superior to the entropy ones is grammaticality. 
This is an interesting finding, not least because grammaticality attempts 
Third, the entropy measures work a lot better in the no transfer 
condition, regardless of stimulus type, as opposed to the transfer 
conditions. Now, strictly speaking, the entropy measures do not quite 
apply in the transfer case (at least not in a sensible way) since all the 
symbols are different. Of course, in applying the entropy measures in 
the transfer case we follow the fairly standard assumption that partici-
pants’ performance is driven either by abstract symbolic versions of 
the actual stimuli (e.g., Vokey and Brooks, 1991) or that there is some 
kind of mapping between the symbols employed in training and test 
(e.g., Redington and Chater, 1996; see also Tunney and Altmann, 
2001). But, the correlations between the entropy measures and gram-
maticality endorsements in the transfer conditions show that, in such 
conditions, participants are not sensitive to the uncertainty regarding 
either bigram or trigram continuations in test items.
To appreciate why the entropy model fails in the transfer case, 
it is useful to consider approaches which have been successful in 
accounting for transfer results. One such approach involves pos-
tulating a sensitivity to the repetition structure in each stimulus. 
For example, adjacent repetition structure concerns the number 
of immediately consecutive identical elements (cf. Mathews and 
Roussel, 1997) and global repetition structure concerns the number 
of identical elements in an item (Vokey and Brooks, 1994). Such 
measures have been shown to account for some variance in AGL 
experiments in both no transfer and transfer conditions (Tunney 
and Altmann, 1999, 2001; Scott and Dienes, 2008). There is a strong 
Table 1 | The correlation of the four entropy measures for AgL, and the other AgL performance measures considered in this work, with average 
grammaticality endorsements for the test items in the nine AgL conditions of Pothos et al. (2006) and Pothos and Bailey (2000). Note that there 
were 50 test items in the Pothos et al. (2006) conditions and 32 in the Pothos and Bailey (2000) ones.
 Overall model Summed Summed Average Average gramma- global Anchor edit Length 
  bigrament trigrament bigrament trigrament ticality Ch. Str. Ch. Str. distance 
Pothos et al. (2006)
Letter strings F(9,40) = 6.21 0.15 −0.46** −0.61** −0.61** 0.71** 0.48** 0.57** −0.32* 0.07 
 p < 0.0005
Embedded F(9,40) = 6.30 0.09 −0.26 −0.25 −0.47** 0.52** 0.36* 0.63** −0.36* 0.26 
shapes p < 0.0005
Sequences of F(9,40) = 10.0 0.19 −0.61** −0.69** −0.67** 0.76** 0.37** 0.58** −0.22 −0.10 
cities p < 0.0005
TrAnSFer          
Letter strings F(9,40) = 1.14 0.24 −0.00 −0.08 −0.08 0.15 −0.07 0.12 −0.06 0.09 
 p = 0.36
Embedded F(9.40) = 2.17 0.23 0.25 0.01 0.04 0.04 −0.06 0.05 −0.03 0.34 
shapes p = 0.045
Sequences of F(9.40) = 2.84 0.27 −0.29* −0.17 −0.27 0.23 −0.16 0.11 0.06 −0.09 
cities p = 0.011
Pothos and Bailey (2000)
Embedded F(9,21) = 2.61 0.42* 0.17 −0.05 −0.37* 0.31 0.27 0.30 0.07 0.47** 
shapes p = 0.034
Lines F(9,21) = 2.17 −0.18 −0.43* −0.28 −0.51** 0.28 0.43* 0.47** −0.29 −0.10 
 p = 0.069
Sequences of F(9,21) = 3.17 0.02 −0.11 −0.02 −0.20 0.41* 0.37* 0.25 −0.35 0.05 
shapes p = 0.014
Note: An ‘*’ flags a correlation significant at the 0.05 level and a ‘**’ flags one significant at the 0.01 level. Italic entries simply indicate the highest and next highest 
correlations with grammaticality endorsements in a particular condition (for the entropy measures, we highlighted only correlations which are in the expected 
direction). The ‘overall model’ column shows the F test for a regression model to predict grammaticality endorsements on the basis of all AGL performance measures 
entered concurrently.
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test stimulus sets). Note that the AGL results analyzed in this work 
involve both the standard procedure of presenting stimuli as  letter 
strings, but also procedures in which the underlying symbolic 
structure of the stimuli would be less salient (such as embedded 
arrangements of shapes or sequences of line segments). The suc-
cess of the entropy model to (partly) account for grammatical-
ity endorsements in such conditions further supports the notion 
that human learning may be biased to process regularity at a more 
abstract level, independent of particular stimulus characteristics (as 
noted, it still debated as to exactly how independent of stimulus 
properties human learning is).
In employing Shannon entropy to understand AGL perform-
ance, the underlying proposal about human learning is that people 
are sensitive to the regularity of information in the environment, in 
the specific sense that there is more regularity when there are fewer 
options to select from and these options are associated with either 
very high or very low probability. Put differently, most models of 
AGL (and cognitive processes in general) assume that the cognitive 
system exploits regularity in its environment in a particular way. 
An entropy approach is about quantifying regularity in a particular 
way. The advantage of adopting entropy, and the more general 
Information Premise from which specific models are developed, is 
that this is a very general framework for understanding uncertainty 
which, in turn, means that it can be applied in diverse areas. So, 
the key advantage of an entropy approach is its generality. At face 
value, Shannon entropy may seem a rather unlikely candidate for 
a unifying explanatory principle for diverse cognitive processes. 
However, this initial impression is misleading—we next consider 
an entropy model of categorization and an entropy model of rea-
soning behavior.
In categorization, work by Pothos and Chater (2002) has a 
straightforward interpretation in terms of the Information Premise. 
In their work it has been assumed that the instances in our experi-
ence are encoded in terms of similarity information; that is, for each 
object we encode the similarity information of this object with all 
other objects. Pothos and Chater suggested that the objective of 
categorization would be to describe this similarity information 
in a more compact and efficient way. In other words, categories 
were seen as a means of simplifying the description of the similar-
ity structure of a set of items as much as possible. The particular 
model Pothos and Chater investigated was framed around the 
notion of Minimum Description Length (Rissanen, 1978), so that 
to model AGL performance on the basis of a simple binary distinction 
between G and NG items. Grammaticality works best with the Pothos 
et al.’s (2006) results, but these results were obtained using the Reber 
and Allen (1978) materials. As these materials were put together specifi-
cally with a view to examine Reber’s early rules hypothesis, one might 
speculate that the materials are particularly favorable to this hypothesis. 
Theoretically, as noted, the grammaticality measure is probably better 
aligned with rules hypotheses in AGL, such as that of Dulany et al.’s 
(1984), rather than the early one by Reber (cf. Reber, 1993).
The correlations between the four entropy measures and the 
other measures for AGL performance are shown in Table 2. The most 
important conclusion from this table is that the entropy measures 
display a rich pattern of relationships with the existing measures of 
AGL performance. As discussed, this is desirable in the sense that all 
the AGL measures are based on some kind of statistical information 
from training (even grammaticality, since the underlying finite state 
grammar can be seen as a particular representation of regularity in 
the training items), so that it would have been puzzling to fail to 
observe a rich pattern of correlations. A less reassuring, but expected, 
conclusion is that the results somewhat differ between the Reber 
and Allen (1978) grammar and the Knowlton and Squire (1996, 
Exp. 1) one. For example, edit distance and length both correlate 
with the bigram summed entropy measure for the Knowlton and 
Squire grammar, but this is not the case for the Reber and Allen one. 
It is interesting to note that summed trigram entropy correlates, on 
average, most highly with the other performance measures, but this 
was not the measure which correlated most highly with participant 
performance. Thus, it is not the case that the best entropy measure 
is the one which simply covaries the most with existing measures. 
A final observation is that edit distance and length correlated, on 
average, more so with the summed entropy measures, compared to 
the average ones. One can see why this is the case, by considering 
that edit distance computations are likely to depend on length (the 
longer the two items that are compared, the more, on average, the 
expected number of changes required to convert one into the other), 
as is the case with the summed entropy measures.
concludIng commentS
Entropy appears to provide a very promising approach for under-
standing AGL performance. There were entropy measures which 
correlated highly with average grammaticality endorsements across 
nine AGL conditions, with two different grammars (and  training/
Table 2 | The correlations of the entropy measures and the other measures of AgL performance for the reber and Allen (1978) training, test stimulus 
sets and for the Knowlton and Squire (1996, exp. 1) training, test stimulus sets.
 Summed Average
 Bigram entropy  Trigram entropy Bigram entropy  Trigram entropy
Grammaticality 0.15/0 −0.67**/−0.33 −0.68**/−0.54** −0.80**/−0.70**
Global Ch. Str. 0.06/−0.32 −0.38*/−0.53* −0.39**/−0.07 −0.67**/−0.43*
Anchor Ch. Str. −0.04/0.25 −0.54**/0.03 −0.43**/0.06 −0.65**/−0.23
Edit distance 0.19/0.51** 0.37**/0.54** 0.16/0.02 0.22/0.17
Length 0.12/0.96** 0.52**/0.74** 0.09/0.06 −0.11/−0.01
Note: Each cell of the table shows the correlation between an entropy measure and a standard AGL measure for the Reber and Allen grammar (first number) and 
the corresponding correlation for the Knowlton and Squire grammar (second number). Correlations which are significant at the 0.05 level are flagged with an ‘*’ and 
correlations which are significant at the 0.01 level are flagged with an ‘**’.
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Cognitive research based on Shannon entropy has two 
 important limitations, one theoretical and the other empiri-
cal. First, on the theoretical front, entropy models work best 
in situations where there is a choice amongst different alterna-
tives, such that each alternative can be assigned a probability 
value. However, entropy models are less able to handle situations 
in which complex representational issues arise. For example, 
researchers have demonstrated that in certain situations similar-
ity judgments may violate the metric axioms, such as symmetry. 
How could an entropy approach explain that the psychologi-
cal similarity between items A and B may lead to one value, 
but the similarity between items B and A to another? Overall, 
the mathematics of entropy do not provide us with many tools 
for understanding representation and corresponding options 
tend to be somewhat limited (cf. Pothos and Chater, 2002). By 
contrast, the mathematics of quantum theory, for example, is 
the most general mathematical framework for assigning prob-
abilities to subspaces. It has been used extremely successfully 
in physics for 100 years or so and it has recently started being 
introduced in psychology as well (Atmanspacher et al., 2004; 
Khrennikov, 2004; Busemeyer et al., 2006, 2009; Pothos and 
Busemeyer, 2009).
On the empirical front, entropy models can, at best, inform 
researchers as to what is the relevant computational principle 
regarding different aspects of cognition. They cannot as such 
help determine whether the underlying brain systems are the 
same or not. For example, suppose that after extensive research 
it is concluded that both learning processes (as exemplified by 
AGL experiments) and reasoning processes (in specific tasks such 
as the Wason selection task) can both be understood in terms of 
Shannon entropy models. Such a conclusion would mean, for 
example, that human behavior in learning and reasoning can be 
predicted in the same way. But it is still possible that the underly-
ing brain systems are separate and even modular. Neuroscience 
methods appear particularly well-suited for questions relating 
to the single vs. multiple systems debate (e.g., Ashby et al., 1998; 
for an interesting discussion see Plunkett and Bandelow, 2006). 
In AGL there have been several neuroscience investigations in 
the last couple of years (mostly fMRI), however, differences in 
methodology have so far prevented the emergence of a confi-
dent conclusion (e.g., Fletcher et al., 1999; Skosnik et al., 2002; 
Lieberman et al., 2004; Smith and McDowall, 2006; Pothos and 
Wood, 2009).
In sum, the results reported in this paper corroborate the 
view that the application of entropy approaches in AGL can 
be very promising. It has been shown that a “minimalist” 
application of entropy ideas led to a very good description of 
AGL results across a range of conditions and to entropy mod-
els which related very well to alternative AGL models. Future 
work should attempt to provide more direct experimental 
tests of this entropy approach to AGL and finer investiga-
tions of the computational properties of the corresponding 
models.
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its predictions required the computation of various codelengths 
(e.g., the codelength for the similarity structure of the stimuli with 
and without categories). However, the codelengths in the model 
simply reflected the uncertainty in determining the corresponding 
information, so that they were computed as entropies. According to 
Pothos and Chater’s (2002) model, the preferred classification for a 
set of items is the one that minimizes the uncertainty in predicting 
the similarity relations between a set of stimuli, which is a direct 
application of the Information Premise.
Perhaps a formal link between AGL and categorization is 
not so surprising; after all, AGL can be seen as a special case of 
a categorization task, and previous research has already been 
taken advantage of such a possible equivalence (cf. the exemplar 
models of AGL; Brooks and Vokey, 1991; Vokey and Brooks, 
1994; Pothos and Bailey, 2000). However, a link with reasoning 
would certainly be less intuitive. At a broad level, AGL does 
involve some kind of a decision making process, in the sense that 
different test items are selected as G or NG. But this type of deci-
sion cannot be intuitively reconciled with the more traditional 
processes of deductive reasoning, whereby starting from a set 
of premises people come up with one or more conclusions. An 
impressive demonstration of the relevance of the Information 
Premise in the Wason Selection Task (e.g., Wason and Johnson-
Laird, 1972) was provided by Oaksford and Chater (1994). The 
Wason selection task is a simple reasoning problem in which 
people are asked to examine whether a conditional rule is true 
or false, by making selections among a set of cards (the cards 
are labeled with one clause of the conditional and contain hid-
den information about the other clause of the conditional). 
Oaksford and Chater (1994) suggested that people select these 
cards that minimize the expected uncertainty in deciding whether 
the rule is true or not; uncertainty was quantified using the 
exact same notion of Shannon entropy that we used in this 
research, so that their model reflects another application of the 
Information Premise.
How compelling are the above equivalences? Clearly, there are 
several different ways in which the Information Premise can be 
translated to a specific model to describe a cognitive process. While 
the Information Premise asserts that all models reflect minimization 
of uncertainty, the exact mathematical specification of uncertainty 
in different situations is certainly not set in stone. However, the 
merit of the above discussion is seen in that, although there can 
be several different applications of the Information Premise for 
the same cognitive problem, such alternatives still need to share 
a similar foundation (a specific use of probabilities, quantifying 
uncertainty in a certain way, etc.), that would make them much 
more similar, as a class of models, compared to others.
Researchers have been exploring the potential of Shannon 
entropy for psychological models for several decades (for earlier 
attempts see, e.g., Miller, 1958; Garner, 1974). In trying to develop 
entropy models of cognitive processes as diverse as categoriza-
tion, learning, and reasoning, the aim is to provide a theoretical 
framework to formally explore the relations between such cogni-
tive processes. In other words, whether (e.g.) learning, categori-
zation, and reasoning are different facets of the same cognitive 
process, or not, is clearly an empirical issue. Shannon entropy 
simply provides a theoretical medium for investigating their puta-
tive equivalence.
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